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Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts: The Constitutional Standard After Washington v. Davis
Political equality demands more than mere arithmetical compliance with the "one person, one vote" standard for apportionment. 1
Election districting schemes must ensure each voter "an equally effective voice" in the political process.2 Multimember districting, in
which the district-wide constituency elects at-large two or more representatives, can deny racial minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the district's political processes. The Supreme Court
recognized this fact in White v. Regester,3 in which it held that multimember districts that "cancel out or minimize'' minority voting
strength violate the equal protection clause.4
The protection developed in White against vote dilution in multimember districts now faces a serious challenge. In a case subsequent to White, Washington v. .Davis,S the Supreme Court insisted
that plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination in violation of the equal
protection clause must prove that the defendant harbored a racially
discriminatory intent.6 In contrast, the standard used in the multimember district cases rests squarely upon effect: whether, in light of
''the totality of the circumstances,"7 the multimember district minimizes or cancels out voting strength.8
This Note argues that the effect-oriented standard for multimember-district vote-dilution claims is unaffected by the Washington intent requirement. Part I outlines the manner in which multimember
districts can dilute minority voting strength. After summarizing
Washington's intent requirement, Part II surveys the post-Washington vote dilution cases and demonstrates that the applicability of the
I. See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 17 (1968); Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Mu/timember .Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA: L. REv. 666, 669 (1972).
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
3. 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
A. Multimember districts may deny political minorities an equal voice as well. See Fort•
son v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Thus far, however, only racial minorities have successfully
attacked multimember districts. The test established in White, the only Supreme Court case
invalidating a multimember district, focuses upon racial vote dilution.
5. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
6. 426 U.S. at 240.
7. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973).
8. In addition to White, see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F .2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), o/.[d. per curiam on other grounds sub nom.
East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
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intent standard to vote dilution claims is uncertain. Part III first suggests two ways in which White and Washington may be reconciled.
That section then argues that White is unaffected by the intent requirement because the standard for vote dilution fits within a fundamental interest analysis not altered by Washington. Finally, Part III
asserts that, even if racial vote dilution is treated as a form of racial
discrimination, the effect-oriented test used in White survives because it is not the kind of disproportionate-impact analysis rejected
in Washington.

I.

THE PROBLEM WITH MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS

Multimember districting tends to submerge the votipg strength of
racial or ethnic minorities. For example, suppose that over half the
voters in a single-member district are black. If a multimember district is formed by combining that district with districts containing a
majority of white voters, the black voters might constitute something
less than a majority of the larger district's voting population. If that
occurs, the black voters have been "submerged" in the white majority. Under some circumstances, such a submergence dilutes the voting strength of the minority, thereby impairing that group's ability to
elect the representative of its choice. Under White, such vote dilution in a multimember district denies that minority's right to "effective participation in political life" in violation of the equal protection
clause.
Of course, multimember districting will not inevitably dilute minority voting strength. It cannot be said in the abstract that a minority would prefer complete control over the representative of a
single-member district to an influence short of control of two or
more representatives of a multimember district. 9 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has refused to hold multimember districts per se unconstitutional.10 In White, the only case in which it has found a
9. See UNITED STATES CoMMN. ON CML RIGHTS, POLffiCAL PARTICIPATION 21 n.6
(1968):
Nor does every measure which has the effect of diluting the votes of Negroes necessarily
have an adverse effect on Negro voters. For example, some would argue that it is better
for Negroes to constitute 40 percent of the voters of two districts-almost half the constituencies of two representatives-than 80 percent of the voters of one district.
In addition, see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964); Jewell, Local Systems ef
Representation: Political Consequences and Judicial Choices, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 790, 798,
803 (1968).
10. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973). On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has recognized several objectionable aspe~ of multimember districting and has expressed a preference against it, absent unusual circumstances, in judicially created apportionment schemes. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,415 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976) (per curiam).
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multimember district unconstitutional, the Court relied on "an intensely local appraisal" of the specific multimember district "in the
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." 11
The presence or history of racial discrimination in the region in
question is an important factor in determining how multimember
districting affects minority voting strength. Even past discrimination by the government may have debilitating effects upon minority
participation in the political process. The prior use of discriminatory registration tests and poll taxes deprived many potential minority voters of the opportunity or inclination to vote. Until recently,
segregative policies of the political parties deprived minority voters
of the experience or benefit of political organization. Thus, minorities have had little opportunity to form coalitions and participate in
the politics of pluralism. 12 Furthermore, disproportionately low educational, employment, and income levels hinder minority members
from running for office or working in campaigns.
Moreover, in a region with a history of racial discrimination, private prejudice is likely to be expressed through racial bloc voting.
An interest group must have more supporters to control an election
in a multimember district than in a single-member district, 13 of
course, and thus a racial minority able to elect a favored representative solely with its own votes in a single-member district might be
unable to elect a representative of its choice in a multimember district without white votes. But minority or minority-supported candidates are less able to draw the needed white votes where bloc
voting occurs along racial lines. 14 Moreover, the minority bloc vot11. 412 U.S. at 769-70.
12. See Derfner, Multi-Member Districts and Black Voters, 2 BLACK L.J. 120, 127-28
(1972). See also Sandalow, Judicial Protection ofMinorities, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1162 (1977).
Professor Sandalow argues that "pluralistic politics furnish substantial safeguards" to minority
interests for those legislative judgments made by Congress after considered deliberation or,
perhaps, made by most state legislatures. Id. at 1191. According to Sandalow, however,
pluralistic politics may not provide adequate safeguards at local government levels, which
"experience demonstrates . . . are typically less sensitive to minority interests than the Congress," id. at 1192, and from which minorities may be excluded. But see Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 52:
"To mobilize a majority of the votes in an election, each political party must appeal to a
variety of 'interests' and a wide spectrum of opinion. . . . In short, the 'monolithic' majority
. . . does not exist; the majority is but a coalition of minorities which must act in a moderate,
broadly representative fashion to preserve itself." Professor Auerbach's analysis might well be
an accurate description of the pluralistic pasturing involved in most elections. It does not,
however, satisfactorily assess those elections in which multimember district vote dilution allows the candidates to ignore the interests of a minority group.
13. See Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Districts, 68 MICH. L. REV.
1577, 1586-87 (1970).
14. Justice White has recognized this fact. In his opinion for the plurality in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1977), he stated:
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ing necessary for the group to have a realistic possibility of electing a
candidate may be exploited by white politicians to generate white
backlash, thereby strengthening bloc voting against the minoritysupported candidate. 15 Thus, where pervasive racial discrimination
exists, multimember districts enhance the likelihood that discrimination will affect elections.
Multimember districts not only increase the difficulty of electing
minority candidates, they also decrease the likelihood that the minority will be adequately represented by the successful white candidates. Nonminority representatives who can win elections without
minority support have little incentive to respond to the particular
needs and interests of the minority. 16 Multimember districts, then,
may adversely affect the quality of representation as well as the voting strength accorded a minority group.
The use of certain electoral rules increases the vote-diluting impact of multimember districts. 17 A "majority" rule requires a runoff election between the two candidates with the most votes if no
candidate receives a majority in the first election. The run-off allows white voters who scattered their votes among various white candidates in the first election to consolidate their vote in the second to
defeat a minority candidate who received a plurality of the vote in
the first election. A "place" rule, requiring each candidate to run
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because of his race is an unfortunate
practice. But it is not rare; and in any district where it regularly happens, it is unlikely
that any candidate will be elected who is a member of the race that is in the minority in
that district.
In addition, see Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
In United Jewish Organizations, Chief Justice Burger expressed disagreement with this concept: ''The notion that Americans vote in firm blocs has been repudiated in the election of
minority members as mayors and legislators in numerous American cities and districts overwhelmingly white." 430 U.S. at 187 (dissenting opinion). With all due respect, the Chief Justice's statement is overbroad. That blacks have been elected in some districts suggests no
more than that blacks have not been denied participation in the nomination and election
processes of that district. It neither shows that racial bloc voting has been eradicated in other
districts nor refutes Justice White's assessment of the impact ofracial bloc voting where it does
occur.
15. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the Supreme Court recited a district court
finding that, as recently as 1970, a "white-dominated organization . . . in effective control of
Democratic Party candidate slating" in a Texas county employed " 'racial campaign tactics in
white precincts to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming support of the black community.'" 412 U.S. at 766-67 (quoting the district court decision Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp.
704, 727 (W.D. Tex. 1972)).
16. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768 (1973).
17. For a listing of the various means of vote dilution, see Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to
At-Large Elections: The /Jilution Problem, IO GA. L. R.Ev. 353, 358-60 (1976); Derfner, Racial
/Jiscrimination and the Right To Vote, 26 VAND. L. R.Ev. 523, 553-55 (1973). Some of these
features were involved in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973), and in Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), ef.ld. per curiam on other grounds
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). In addition, see
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 143 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
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for a specific "place" or "post,'' results in head-to-head contests for
each office. T.hose whites wishing to vote along racial lines thereby
know which white candidate to vote for to defeat a minority candidate. An "anti-single shot" provision requires the voter to vote for
as many candidates as there are offices to be filled. Under this rule,
the ballot is given no effect if it contains fewer than the maximum
number of votes. Thus, unless the minority can field as many candidates as there are offices, the minority voter cannot vote for a minority candidate without also voting for a nonminority candidate, which
reduces the minority candidate's chance for election.
The generalization that a racial minority with influence short of
control of two or more representatives in a multimember district is
not conclusively disadvantaged compared to a minority having majority control of one representative in a single-member district does
not prove to be accurate in a region characterized by voting along
racial lines. In that circumstance, less than majority control may be
tantamount to no control at all. In a region where both official and
private racial discrimination is less prevalent, however, racial factors
may play a lesser part in the evaluation of candidates, voting may
not fall so squarely on racial lines, and multimember districts will
not inevitably result in racial vote dilution. Where white as well as
minority candidates must seek support across racial lines and where
white voters are willing to support minority candidates, the defeat of
minority candidates will more often be the ordinary result of the political process than of discrimination inherent in that process. 18
The Supreme Court faced a racial vote dilution challenge to a
multimember district for the first time in Whitcomb v. Chavis. 19 In
that case, the plaintiffs alleged that an Indiana statute establishing a
particular county as a multimember district diluted the vote of urban
ghetto dwellers, most of whom were poor blacks.20 The Court refused to invalidate the state statute because the plaintiffs had failed
to carry the burden of proving that the multimember district "unconstitutionally operatefd] to dilute or cancel out" voting strength. 21 In
so holding, the Court noted that no showing had been made that
18. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971), where the Court determined that,
on the facts shown, the failure of the minority "to have legislative seats in proportion to its
population emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor
Negroes."
19. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). A claim of racial vote dilution had been raised in Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965), but was not argued before the Supreme Court and therefore
was not decided.
20. 403 U.S. at 129.
21. 403 U.S. at 144, 146.
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blacks were prevented from registering, voting, or choosing a political party and participating in its affairs. Although no express finding appeared in the record, the Court inferred from the evidence that
the Democratic Party, the dominant party among the urban black
voters, could not afford to ignore them and did not overlook them in
selecting candidates.22 In short, the plaintiffs had failed to show
that they "had less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators
of their choice.23
The Supreme Court sustained a claim of racial vote dilution in a
multimember system two years later in White v. Regester.24 The
county-wide multimember districts of Dallas County and Bexar
County, Texas, were alleged to dilute the vote of blacks and Mexican-Americans, respectively. According to the Court, the "plaintiffs' burden [was] to produce evidence to support findings that the
political processes leading to nomination and election were not
equally open to participation by the group in question." 25 Evidence
convincing the Court that the plaintiffs had met that burden included a history of governmental racial discrimination in the locality; a "majority vote" requirement and "place" rule; the fact that
only two blacks had ever been elected in Dallas County to the Texas
House of Representatives; the failure of the legislature in question,
as well as of the two political parties, to show a good-faith concern
for minority needs; the recent use of racial campaign tactics; a cultural and language barrier that inhibited the Mexican-Americans'
participation in Bexar County's electoral process; and restrictive
voter registration requirements.26 Based on "the totality of the circumstances," the Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that
the multimember districts in question excluded plaintiffs "from effective participation in political life."27
White v. Regester has often been examined and applied. The
Fifth Circuit, which has decided most of the multimember district
cases, explicated White thoroughly in Zimmer v. McKeithen. 28 The
22. 403 U.S. at 149-50 & n.30.
23. 403 U.S. at 149.
24. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
25. 412 U.S. at 766.
26. 412 l.1.S. at 765-69.
27. 412 U.S. at 769.
28. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), '!l.fd per curiam on other grounds sub nom.
East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). Zimmer established "access
to the political process" as the "barometer of dilution of minority voting strength." 485 F.2d
at 1303. As to proof establishing a lack of political access, the Zimmer court said that
[w]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates,
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standard developed in Whitcomb and White and adopted in Zimmer for deten:niniilg the constitutionality of multimember districts29
the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy
underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of
past discrimination in general precludes the effective participation in the election system,
a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of
provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts. The
fact of dilution is established upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors.
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in White v. Regester .•. demonstrates,
however, that all these factors need not be proved in order to obtain relief.
485 F.2d at 1305.
Zimmer involved the validity of a federal district court-ordered malapportionment remedy
that included a change from single-member to multimember districts. The Supreme Court
amrmed the Fifth Circuit's invalidation of the plan solely on the basis of Connor v. Johnson,
402 U.S. 690 (1971), which stated a preference for single-member districts in court-ordered
apportionment plans. 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). The Court explicitly stated that the
judgment was amrmed "without approval of the constitutional views expressed by the Court
of Appeals." 424 U.S. at 638. Nonetheless, the Court's opinion did not imply disapproval of
those views, and the Fifth Circuit has continued to rely on Zimmer. See Nevett v. Sides, 571
F.2d 209,214 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978); Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 563 F.2d 180, 184 (5th
Cir. 1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 926 (5th Cir. 1977); Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108,
lll l (5th Cir. 1976).
29. Minority voting strength may also be diluted by racially gerrymandered single-member
districts or by annexation that alters the racial composition of the political unit. For a catalog
of dilutive districting schemes and election procedures, see Derfner, supra note 17, at 553-58.
A gerrymandered single-member district might either concentrate substantially all the minority voters within one district, see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), or divide minority voters among several districts, see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 {1977); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139
(5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). In the first instance, minority voters may
complain that their political influence has been diluted because their votes have been restricted
to one district. In the second instance, minority voters may claim that their voting strength has
been diluted because their votes have been diffused over several districts and therefore do not
constitute a strong political force in any one district.
Although it is unclear what standard the Supreme Court will use to evaluate claims that
single-member districting schemes impermissibly dilute minority voting strength, recent cases
suggest that, as in challenges to multimember districts, the Court will inquire whether the plan
"minimizes or cancels out" minority voting strength. In Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977),
the Court did not address the contention of black plaintiffs that their voting strength was
diluted by a reapportionment plan that diffused black voters among several single-member
districts with white majorities. In dictum, however, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
suggested that the plan would be invalid if drawn with the "purpose to minimize the voting
strength of a minority group," 431 U.S. at 425, but gave no indication about what evidence is
necessary to show that black voting strength has in fact been minimized. In all but the extreme case, it is open to debate whether a concentration or diffusion minimizes or maximizes
minority voting strength. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964), in which black
intervenors defended a districting plan challenged by black plaintiffs; United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 172-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result in Connor, stated that
it is not helpful to look at isolated aspects of a statewide apportionment plan in order to
determine whether a racial or other improperly motivated gerrymander has taken place.
Districts that disfavor a minority group in one part of the State may be counterbalanced
by favorable districts elsewhere. A better approach, therefore, is to examine the overall
effect of the apportionment plan on the opportunity for fair representation of minority
voters.
431 U.S. at 427. This notion of overall "fair representation" was advanced earlier in United
Jewish Organizations. In that case, according to Justice White, the voting strength of a group
ofHasidic Jews that was split between two districts with black majorities was not minimized or
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looks to the effect of the district on minority voting strength, not to
the underlying purpose in fashioning that district. 30 Neither Whitcomb nor White was cited or discussed when, in Washington v. JJavis, the Supreme Court established its intent requirement for racial
discrimination claims, and the lower courts have neither convincingly accepted nor rejected the intent requirement in vote dilution
claims. Thus, the current status of the White standard is uncertain. 31 The most recent Fifth Circuit cases hold that the evidence
cancelled out "as long as whites in Kings County, as a group, were provided with fair representation." 430 U.S. at 166. His discussion implied that "fair representation" loosely corresponds to proportion of population, though the Court has stated that a group's failure to elect
legislators in proportion to its size does not by itself state a claim of vote dilution. White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973). Justice Brennan, though concurring in the result, was
not satisfied that the "vicarious" representation implicit in Justice White's notion of fair representation for whites as a group "fully answers the Hasidim's complaint of injustice." 430 U.S.
at 171 n.l.
Thus, it appears that the standard for challenges of vote dilution in single-member districts
may be the same as that stated in White, 412 U.S. at 765: does the plan minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of the group in question? The Supreme Court has not, however, reached
agreement on what evidence is necessary to demonstrate a minimization of voting strength in a
single-member district plan. ·
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has expressly applied to single-member districts both
the White standard and Zimmer test, see note 28 supra, which were developed to assess vote
dilution in multimember districts. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1978); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968
(1977); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1974). This approach
seems logical, particularly where minority voters are diffused across several districts. If those
voters can prove the various factors required by White, they have demonstrated that singlemember districting denies them full and effective participation in the political process. See
note 63 infra. It will be much more difficult, of course, for minority plaintiffs concentrated in
one district to show that their vote has been diluted, since it is likely that the process of nomination and election will be open to minorities in that district and that the minority-favored
candidate will have a fair opportunity to win. See United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at
166-67.
Annexation may dilute minority voting strength simply by adding white voters to the political unit. In Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 931 (1972), the Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, refused to invalidate an annexation that
added 45,706 nonblacks and 1,557 blacks to the city of Richmond, Virginia. According to the
court, the plaintiffs had failed to prove a purposeful design to dilute black voting strength.
The Supreme Court has not decided a constitutional challenge to an annexation. q: City of
Richmond v. United States. 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (discussing annexation under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965). The application of White to an annexation is questionable, since the
White factors are not pertinent to an annexation. An annexation could conceivably add so
many nonminority voters to the political unit that a multimember or single-member district
within that unit comes under suspicion. See generqlly Note, 17ze Right To Vote in Municipal
Annexations, 88 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1571 (1975).
30. Zimmer has been recently in~erpreted "as impliedly recognizing the essentiality of intent in dilution cases by establishing certain categories of circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination." Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1978). See note 79 infra
and accompanying text. But see Judge Wisdom's specially concurring opinion in Nevett, 511
F.2d at 231. Before Washington, however, no court thought that Zimmer or White required
evidence of discriminatory intent.
31. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 754 (1978); The Supreme Court,
1976 Term, 91 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. I, 289 n.34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 17ze Supreme Court, 1976
Tenn].
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required by the Zimmer test is sufficient to establish circumstantial
proof of an invidiously discriminatory purpose. 32 Although White
and Washington can be reconciled in this respect, this Note argues
that the White vote dilution test should be completely exempted
from the Washington intent requirement.

11.

THE WASHINGTONlNTENT TEST AND MULTIMEMBER
DISTRICTS

For several years the Supreme Court has struggled to describe
how the purpose and impact of official action are relevant to equal
protection analysis. The Court's decisions on this problem have
been described as "somewhat less than a seamless web."33 In Washington v. Davis,34 the Court attempted to clarify its position by asserting that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose."35 Lower federal courts faced with vote dilution challenges to multimember districts have responded in disparate ways to
Washington's intent standard. After discussing Washington and how
the lower courts in subsequent cases have treated White, this Note
will argue that proof of invidious discriminatory intent should not be
required of plaintiffs alleging racial vote dilution in multimember
districts.
A.

Washington and the Intent Requirement

The plaintiffs in Washington claimed that a written personnel
test given to job applicants by the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department violated the equal protection clause. They produced evidence that four times as many blacks as whites failed the
test. On the premise that lack of discriminatory intent in the design
or use of the test was irrelevant, the District of Columbia Circuit
held.that the racially disproportionate impact shown by the plaintiffs
established a denial of equal protection.36
The Supreme Court reversed. After stating that it had never
adopted the standard for racial discrimination in employment under
32. E.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
35. 426 U.S. at 240. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977).
36. 512 F.2d'956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The District of Columbia Circuit applied the
standard for judging employment tests set out in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), in which the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
512 F.2d at 959.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196437 as the equal protection
standard, the Court insisted that its cases ''have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact."38 Rather, the
Court declared, "the basic equal protection principle" requires that
"the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."39
Such a purpose "may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another. . . . Disproportionate impact is
not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution," nor does it alone
compel strict scrutiny by the reviewing court.40
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of discriminatory intent
again the next Term in Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing .Development Corp. 41 In that case, the Seventh Circuit had
invalidated a municipality's zoning decision on the ground that its
"ultimate effect" was racially discriminatory.42 The Supreme Court
reversed, reaffirming its position that the equal protection clause requires proof of invidious discriminatory intent. In discussing the
types of evidence that might constitute such proof, the Court acknowledged that disproportionate impact was an "important starting
point."43 In addition, the Court identified as important the historical
background of the decision, the specific events leading to that decision, any substantial departure from normal decision-making procedures, and the legislative or administrative history of the decision.44
B.

Supreme Court References to White v. Regester
After Washington v. Davis

Although the Supreme Court has not decided any vote dilution
cases involving multimember districts since Washington, 45 it has re37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
38. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis original).
39. 426 U.S. at 240.
40. 426 U.S. at 242.
41. 429 U.S. 25_2 (1977).
42. 517 F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1975).
43. 429 U.S. at 266.
44. 429 U.S. at 267-68. The Court did not purport to make an exhaustive summary of the
possible evidence of purposeful discrimination. 429 U.S. at 268.
45. However, the Court has agreed to review the decisipn in Wise v. Lipscomb, 551 F.2d
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ferred to White in subsequent apportionment cases.46 None of the
references, however, reveal whether the Court considers Washington's intent standard to have affected White's effect-oriented test for
multimember districts. Writing for the Court in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 41 Justice White used the standard of White to
explain that Hasidic Jews, whose community had been divided between two districts in a reapportionment plan, had not suffered a
fourteenth or fifteenth amendment violation since "the plan did not
minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength."48 In his
1043 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), which involves the limited use of atlarge elections in a state-drawn apportionment plan.
46. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977).
47. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
48. 430 U.S. at 165. The fifteenth amendment states that the right to vote "shall not be
denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The
role of that amendment in multimember district challenges is uncertain. White was clearly
based upon the fourteenth amendment. See 412 U.S. at 767. As discussed in Part III infta, the
standard used in White was first announced in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965),
The Fortson decision was clearly rooted in the fourteenth amendment and not the fifteenth
because the multimember district in question was attacked by nonminority plaintiffs. Thus, in
White, the Court handled the multimember district problem only under the fourteenth amendment even though the plaintiffs alleging vote dilution were blacks and Mexican-Americans.
Nonetheless, some lower courts have assumed, without discussion, that proof of the White
standard indicates a violation of the fifteenth as well as the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1977); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554
F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). In the most recent pronouncement on the subject, a Fifth Circuit panel expressly held that the fifteenth amendment,
like the fourteenth, requires a showing of improper intent. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 22021 (5th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977), Justice White seemed to suggest that the same evidence, including the fact that the
districting plan in question did not "mioiroi:re or cancel out" voting strength, is probative
under both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 430 U.S. at 165-67. In the same case,
Justice Stewart cited White while discussing the fifteenth amendment, 430 U.S. at 179 (concurring opinion), though one year earlier in his opinion for the Court in Beer v. United States, 425
U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976), he had cited White as a fourteenth amendment ease. At least where
racial vote dilution is alleged, then, it appears to make little difference which amendment is
invoked. The multimember district problem cannot be completely relegated to the fifteenth
amendment, however, since the Supreme Court is still willing to hear vote dilution complaints
from political as well as racial groups. See text at notes 142-162 infta.
Even if the While test has been incorporated into the fifteenth amendment, the questions
remain whether that amendment should provide even greater protection than the fourteenth
and whether the fifteenth amendment would be violated in circumstances other than those
relevant to the White test. The fifteenth amendment standard, specifically the significance of
purpose and effect, is as unclear today as the fourteenth amendment standard was before
Washington. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 69-71 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Bui see Nevel/, 511 F.2d at 220-21.
Justice Stewart, writing for the court in Beer, implied that purposeful discrimination is as
necessary under the fifteenth as the fourteenth amendment. 425 U.S. at 142 n.14. In his
dissenting opinion in Beer, Justice Marshall attempted to show that the fifteenth amendment
standard was the same as that of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)-that is, whether the law or official act in question has the purpose or effect of
abridging the right to vote. 425 U.S. at 148-49. Even in that attempt, however, Justice Marshall could not untangle the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment precedents. 425 U.S. at 148
n.4, 156 & n.15.
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concurrence, Justice Brennan cited Whitcomb v. Chavis, 49 the antecedent of White, as an example of "a classification that effectively
downgraded minority participation in the franchise." 50 Such a classification,. Justice Brennan claimed, would be suspect and prohibited.
Finally, Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, cited White in support of his contention that the Hasidic Jews had not proved a fifteenth amendment violation because they "made no showing that
the redistricting scheme was employed as part of a 'contrivance to
segregate'; to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity
of affected persons to participate in the political process."51
At the least, these references suggest that the standard for judging
multimember districts remains the same as that stated in
'White-that is, whether the plan minimizes or cancels out voting
strength. Unfortunately, they do not clarify whether proof of invidious discriminatory purpose must now be included among the various
factors showing the minimization in voting strength. Writing for the
Court in United Jewish Organizations, Justice White analyzed the
"impact of the . . . plan on the representation of white voters in the
The fifteenth amendment's proscription against abridging the right to vote "on account of
race" could be read to embrace the concerns about irrationality, stigma, and frustration underlying the fourteenth amendment's proscription of racial discrimination. See text at notes 13538 infra. However, the fifteenth amendment leaves open the possibility that voters and
nonvoters may be differentiated on the bases of attributes other than race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. Although differentiations on such bases as literacy or age could conceivably stigmatize or frustrate nonvoters, they are less likely to rest upon irrational assumptions as to the relative worth of different groups than differentiations on the basis of race.
Thus, the fifteenth amendment's prohibition could be limited to racially motivated decisions
that deny or abridge the right to vote. Most of the Supreme Court's fifteenth amendment
decisions can be interpreted as resting upon such an intent standard. See, e.g., Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
On the other hand, it can be argued that, because the fifteenth amendment singles out the
right to vote as deserving express constitutional protection against infringement on account of
race, that amendment guards against more than stigma and frustration. A decision abridging
the right to vote because of race would therefore be impermissible.
For the development of the theory that the fifteenth amendment provides "an aggregate
right to potential proportional representation for racial groups," see Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need To Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 571,572
(1978).
49. 403 U.S. 124 (1971), discussed in text at notes 21-25 supra.
50. 430 U.S. at 170. Justice Brennan's invocation of the "suspect classification" doctrine is
curious. The Supreme Court has not spoken of suspect classifications in any of the cases
involving multimember districts. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379
U.S. 433 (1965). Although race is clearly a suspect classification, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), the Court in Whitcomb did not take that approach to the problem of
multimember districts. See Note, JJiscriminato,y Fjfect oJElections At-Large: The "Totality oJ
Circumstances" JJoctrine, 41 ALB. L. REv. 363, 372 (1977).
51. 430 U.S. at 179.
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county . . as a whole," 52 and thereby strongly suggested that effect
alone remains the focus. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
seemed to agree with that suggestion. On the other hand, Justice
Stewart's comment might indicate that he would require a purposeful minimization or cancelling of the minority vote.
Moreover, the plaintiffs in United Jewish Organizations questioned the constitutionality of a single-member district plan, not of a
multimember district scheme. Although Justice White's concern
with the impact of white voters in the county "as a whole" appears to
recognize an effect test, his opinion is inconclusive, since it may have
merely reflected the concern expressed a month later by Justice
Blackmun in Connor v. Finch: 53 because one single-member district
that disfavors some group may be counterbalanced by a second district elsewhere that favors that group, "it is not helpful to look at
isolated aspects" of the plan for evidence of improper motive.54
Rather, Justice Blackmun contended, the Court should examine the
"overall effect" of the plan on voting strength. 55 Thus, Justice
White may have focused on effect in United Jewish Organizations to
avoid a possibly misleading inquiry into the isolated aspects of the
single-member plan that the Hasidic Jews challenged. Multimember districts do not present that problem, however, since they will not
involve any "counterbalancing" of districts favoring or disfavoring
particular groups and thus involve no misleading "isolated aspects."
Justice White's analysis does not necessarily imply, therefore, that
the Court will not require proof of discriminatory purpose in challenges to multimember districts. 56
52. 430 U.S. at 166.
I
53. 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
54. 431 U.S. at 427 (concurring opinion).
55. 431 U.S. at 427.
56. The Supreme Court also referred to White in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977),
Because the apportionment in question in that case failed to satisfy even the basic one-person,
one-vote standard, the Court did not address the plaintiffs' allegation that it also diluted black
voting strength. The Court did, however, cite White and Whitcomb when referring to the
plaintiff's "claim of impermissible racial dilution." 431 U.S. at 422 & n.22. In light of the
fact that United Jewish Organizations predated Connor, it could be inferred that this citation
affirms the supposition that White's "minimire or cancel out" language survived United Jewish
Organizations and remains the standard for vote dilution claims. However, to infer from this
naked citation that the Court will add discriminatory intent to White's list of evidentiary factors would be mere conjecture. If anything, dicta in the Connor opinion suggest that, at least in
regard to single-member districting, a showing of discriminatory purpose will be required,
See 431 U.S. at 425-26.
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Lower Court .Decisions on the Intent Requirement in Vote
Dilution Cases

The Fifth Circuit's post-Washington vote dilution decisions57
have Iiot been completely consistent, though one panel of that court
may have reconciled these decisions in four consolidated cases recently decided. In Paige v. Gray,58 the first of the decisions after
Washington, black voters challenged an at-large system of electing
city commissioners. The district court, relying on Gomillion v.
Lighifoot, 59 a fifteenth amendment case, had invalidated the system
because its "inevitable effect" was to dilute black voting strength.60
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
for evaluation under the standards developed in White and Zimmer,
warning that "it is likely that the Supreme Court will require circumstantial proof of unlawful motive."61 The panel probably did not
believe, however, that Washington's intent requirement would pose a
substantial obstacle to the plaintiffs or the district court. The only
quotation of Washington in the Paige opinion was of Justice Steven's
concession that where the disproportionate impact is as dramatic as
in Gomillion, "'it really does not matter whether the standard is
phrased in terms of purpose or effect.' " 62
Sitting en bane in the second of the post- Washington cases,
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 63 the Fifth Circuit considered
57. In chronological order, Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976); Kirksey v. Board
of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); David
v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977); Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 563 F.2d 180
(5th Cir. 1977), and four consolidated cases: Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978);
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership,
Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v.
Thomas County, 571 F.2d 2S7 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
S8. 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976).
59. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See text at note 121 i'!fra.
60. 399 F. Supp. 457, 464 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
61. 538 F.2d at 1110.
62. 538 F.2d at 1110 n.3 (quoting 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)). See
text at note I 19 i'!fra.
63. 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). The plaintiffs
in Kirksey claimed that a redistricting scheme diluted black voting strength by splitting a
concentrated black community among five districts. The Fifth Circuit applied the standards
developed in White and Zimmer for judging vote dilution in multimember districts on the
assumption that "they have equal application to redistricting schemes making use of singlemember districts." 554 F.2d at 143. That assumption seems logical in light of the Supreme
Court's handling of redistricting schemes. In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977), which involved a claim identical to that made in Kirksey-that a group's voting
strength had been impermissibly diffused between several single-member districts-the Court
examined the impact on the complaining group's voting strength in the region as a whole. 430
U.S. at 166. In addition, see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,427 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The standards established in White and Zimmer also look to the overall impact of the
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Washington and Arlington Heights 64 at greater length and attempted

to limit the application of those cases in disputes involving racial
vote dilution. Before turning to intent, the court affirmed two findings of fact. First, the plaintiffs had proved at trial that, at least
until only a few years earlier, blacks in Hinds County had been intentionally excluded from participation in the political process.65
Second, a showing had been made that the districting plan had been
drawn without any improper motive.66 Despite the second finding,
the court invalidated the districting scheme because of its perpetuation of the proven prior intentional discrimination:
Where a plan, though itself racially neutral, carries forward intentional
and purposeful discriminatory denial of access [to the political process]
that is already in effect, it is not constitutional. Its benign nature cannot insulate the redistricting government entity from the existent taint.
If a neutral plan were permitted to have this effect, minorities presently
denied access to political life for unconstitutional reasons could be
walled off from relief against continuation of that denial. The redistricting body would only need to adopt a racially benign plan that permitted the record of the past to continue unabated. Such a rule would
sub silentio overrule White v. Regester. It would emasculate the efforts
of racial minorities to break out of patterns of political discrimination.67

Although conceding that Washington and Arlington Heights sharpened the emphasis on discriminatory purpose, the Fifth Circuit insisted that "nothing in these cases suggests that, where purposeful
and intentional discrimination already exists, it can be constitutionally perpetuated into the future by neutral official action." 68 In effect, the court interpreted the equal protection clause as placing an
affirmative duty upon the defendant board of supervisors to ameliorate the residual impact of past discrimination.69
districting scheme on political participation. Thus, the Fifth Circuit was justified in applying
those standards to the redistricting plan in Kirksey.
A federal district court in the District ·or Columbia has similarly applied the standards
developed in multimember district cases to single-member district complaints. See Beer v.
United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 394 n.254 (D.C. 1974), vacated and remanded on statutory
grounds, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
64. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
65. 554 F.2d at 144.
66. 554 F.2d at 146.
67. 554 F.2d at 146-47.
68. 554 F.2d at 148.
69. 554 F.2d at 148 n.16. For support for its decision, the court analogized to the school
desegregation case of Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the Supreme
Court placed upon a formerly de jure segregated school district an affirmative duty to disestablish the dual system. The Supreme Court then invalidated a "freedom of choice" plan for
assigning students to schools because, though not itself objectionable, it served to perpetuate
segregation rather than end it.
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The adamant tone of Kirksey notwithstanding, the Fifth Circuit
did not sufficiently explain its holding in that case or its assertion
that Washington and Arlington Heights are free of any suggestion
that past intentional discrimination may constitutionally be perpetuated by neutral official action. The court argued that Washington
and Arlington Heights
would be of particular significance in the present case if the only issue
were whether the racially neutral plan created such exclusion [from the
political process] in Hinds County. But there is a second issue which
we have pointed out, whether the plan; though neutral in design, was
the instrumentality for carrying forward patterns of purposeful and intentional discrimination that already existed in violation of our Constitution.70

The Supreme Court's holdings are not that narrow, however. Washington demands that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."71 Contrary to the Kirksey court's assertion,
nothing in Washington or Arlington Heights limits that principle to
laws or official acts allegedly creating racial discrimination, as opposed to laws or acts allegedly perpetuating racial discrimination.
Perhaps the Fifth Circuit meant that in adopting the districting plan
the defendant board of supervisors consciously intended to perpetuate a denial of access to the political process. However, it is certainly arguable that such an intent satisfies Washington's
requirement, even though the plan itself was designed according to
wholly neutral criteria. The court, then, had no reason to hold Washington inapposite.
If, however, the court meant that the defendant board acted without any improper motive, and that the scheme should be invalidated
nonetheless because it perpetuated the past intentional discriminations not only of past boards but also of others unrelated to this
board, then more explanation is needed, for that holding stretches
the concept of intent beyond its normally understood meaning. Perhaps the Kirksey court read Washington's intent requirement as saying that, although an invidious law must be rooted in intentional
discrimination, the intentional discrimination that taints the law may
be something other than the motivation underlying the law's passage
or subsequent retention. Thus, where a districting plan that perpetuates a past intentional denial of political participation is passed
70. 554 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (emphasis original), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968
(1977).
71. .426 U.S. at 240.
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with a wholly nondiscriminatory intent, or where such a plan is retained for wholly permissible reasons, the plan is sufficiently associated with and tainted by the past intentional denial to be said to
have an invidious quality traceable to intentional discrimination.
But that interpretation comes close to the very argument the
Supreme Court rejected in Washington: "that a law or other official
act . . . is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."72 In almost any context, a disproportionate burden
upon blacks can ultimately be traced to some intentional discrimination. This Note will argue in Part III that Washington can be satisfied by a racially selective indifference, even absent a conscious
discriminatory purpose in the passage or retention of the law.73 The
court may have been essaying a similar argument in Kirksey, but, by
failing to limit its concept of intent, it re-invoked, at least to some
extent, the rejected disproportionate-effect standard.
It is curious that the next two Fifth Circuit cases, .David v. Garrison 14 and Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Board,15 neither mentioned Washington nor inquired into discriminatory intent. Both
cases relied on the factors developed in Zimmer to evaluate claims
that multimember districts dilute minority voting strength. 76 And
though the court in Parnell listed "motivation for the districting
scheme" as one of the factors to be considered under Zimmer,7 1 both
the .David and Parnell courts based their investigations of constitutionality squarely on the effect of multimember districting, not on
the motivation behind it.
The most thorough analysis to date of the post- Washington vote
dilution doctrine came in four multimember district cases recently
decided together.78 In the most important of . those ,four cases
72. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis original).
73. See text at note 111 infra.
74. 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977).
75. 563 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. In .David, the court determined that a district court finding that an at-large election
plan was unconstitutional was not supported by adequate findings of fact. In Parnell, the
court upheld the district court's finding that certain multimember districts unconstitutionally
diluted black voting power.
77. 563 F.2d at 184. To suggest that the "motivation of the districting scheme" is one of
the factors to be considered under Zimmer is misleading. At least prior to Washington, Zimmer did not require discriminatory intent for a finding of vote dilution. It did assert that a
multimember district must be invalidated if''the state policy favoring multimember or at-large
districting schemes is rooted in racial discrimination." 485 F.2d at 1305. It also stated that "a
tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multimember or at-large districting" helps
to establish the fact of dilution. 485 F.2d at 1305. It did not, however, suggest that either is
necessary before the court may hold a multimember district unconstitutional. But see Nevett v.
Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1978).
78. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238
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-Nevett v. Sides19-the court held that the Washington intent requirement does apply to claims of racial vote dilution in
multimember districts. 80 After discussing Whitcomb, White, and
Zimmer and after reiterating Washington's holding, the panel said,
"The language of the Court in .Davis and Arlington Heights is unambiguous and admits of no exception. Analytically, nothing about atlarge districting legislation suggests that it should be treated differently from any other manifestation or official action that may impact
groups of people differentially."81 The court then asserted that the
Fifth Circuit's prior vote dilution cases are consistent with that holding, since Zimmer "impliedly recogniz[es] the essentiality of intent in
dilution cases by establishing certain categories of circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination."82 Moreover, the court held
that circumstantial evidence will satisfy the intent requirement
"[w]hether invidious discrimination motivates the adoption or
maintenance of a disiricting scheme or whether the plan furthers preexisting purposeful discrimination." 83 After examining the district
court's application of the Zimmer factors to the voting scheme in
question, the panel affirmed the decision that the scheme did not
dilute the black plaintiffs' vote. 84
The Nevett court, after examining a line of cases from Reynolds
v. Sims 85 (the landmark apportionment decision) through Whitcomb, to White and Zimmer, concluded that racial vote dilution in
(5th Cir. 1978); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248
(5th Cir. 1978); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1978) (per curiam).
Nevel/ was on appeal before the Fifth Circuit for the second time and was therefore labelled by the court Nevel/ II. This Note will refer to it simply as Nevel/. On the first appea(
the Fifth Circuit had reversed and remanded a district court decision for the black plaintiffs.
533 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1976).
79. 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
80. 571 F.2d at 215. Judge Wisdom specially concurred in Judge Tjoflat's opinion. Although he agreed that the black plaintiffs had not been the victims of unconstitutional vote
dilution, he argued that it would not be inconsistent with Washington or Arlington Heights to
prohibit vote dilution "without proof of racial discriminatory purpose." 571 F.2d at 231.
81. 571 F.2d at 218. The court held that discriminatory purpose is essential to a fifteenth
amendment as well as a fourteenth amendment claim.
82. 571 F.2d at 215.
83. 571 F.2d at 221 (emphasis added).
84. 571 F.2d at 229. The court disposed of the three other consolidated cases according to
the principles established in Nevel/. Bolden v. City ofMobile branded the challenged at-large
scheme, which had been adopted in 1911, "archetypal of the intentionally maintained plan"
condemned in Nevel/. 571 F.2d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1978). Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978), and Thomasville Branch of the
NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), were both remanded
for determinations under Nevetfs reading of Zimmer whether there had been intentional discrimination.
85. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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multimember districts does not differ from any other differentially
'impacting official act. Part III of this Note suggests that that conclusion is wrong because the court failed to examine Fortson v. JJorsey, 86 a case decided between Reynolds and Whitcomb, which first
recognized the racial vote dilution claim. 87 The Nevel/ court thus
misunderstood, as have all the lower courts dealing with this problem, the nature of the multimember-district vote-dilution claim.
Moreover, the court's conclusion that a discriminatory purpose in
either the adoption or maintenance of a districting scheme satisfies
Washington answers the problem of intent in vote dilution claims
only partially. Despite its statement that the intent requirement
may be satisfied where the districting plan merely "furthers preexisting purposeful discrimination," 88 the Nevel/ panel apparently read
Kirksey as involving a districting scheme adopted with the conscious
purpose of carrying forward past intentional discrimination. 89 That
reading leaves unresolved the more difficult problem suggested by
Kirksey: Whether, given the intent requirement, a finding that a districting scheme which dilutes minority votes was designed, and
passed or maintained, wholly without a conscious intent to discriminate, forecloses a holding of unconstitutional vote dilution.
Thus, after one Fifth Circuit panel accepted Washington in
Paige, the circuit en bane attempted to limit its applicability in Kirksey. A third panel ignored Washington in JJavid and Parnell
before a fourth again accepted Washington and applied it to the vote
dilution doctrine in Nevett. None of these cases, however, explored
in sufficient detail the ways in which the White test can be reconciled with Washington's intent requirement, and none satisfactorily
explained why White should be exempt from that requirement.
Part III of this Note treats those matters.
86. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
87. See text at note 140 i'!fra.
88. 571 F.2d at 221.
89. In reference to Kirksey, the Nevel/ court said, "Where the plan [that perpetuates past
intentional discrimination] is maintained with the purpose of excluding minority input, the
necessary intent is established, and the plan is unconstitutional. We so hold today in Bolden
v. City of Mobile." 571 F.2d at 222. In Bolden, the court cited specific evidence of intent,
including a legislative attempt to justify on non-racial grounds and thereby perpetuate the
challenged at-large system, and the legislature's acute awareness of the racial consequences of
its districting policies. 571 F.2d at 246. These are examples of a conscious discriminatory
intent.
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TEST AFTER Washington

As suggested by the survey both of post-Washington Supreme
Court references to White and of lower court reactions to the intent
requirement in vote dilution cases, the status of the White test for
multimember districts is unclear. This Note attempts to reconcile
White and Washington by suggesting two ways in which some of
the factors listed in White may provide circumstantial evidence of
purposeful discrimination. The Note argues further, however, that
White should be viewed as unaffected by Washington for two reasons. First, because it was designed as a protection of the right to
vote as defined in Reynolds v. Sims, 90 the effect-oriented test in
White falls within a traditional fundamental interest analysis unchanged by Washington's requirement of intent in racial discrimination claims. Second, even if it is viewed more narrowly as
protection only against a form of racial discrimination, the test in
White does not depend upon the type of disproportionate-impact
analysis rejected in Washington. Rather, the impact required to satisfy White falls solely upon the racial minority in question and is
analogous to a type of impact-oriented standard apparently approved in Washington.

A.

Reconciling White and Washington: Circumstantial Evidence
efPurposeful .Discrimination

I.

The White Test as an Indicator ef Conscious .Discriminatory
Purpose

The Fifth Circuit panel in Nevett v. Sides held that some of the
factors listed in White and Zimmer provide circumstantial evidence
that an electoral scheme was adopted or maintained for the purpose
of impairing minority voting strength.91 That holding follows logically from the Supreme Court's statements. Washington does not
require "that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute."92 An invidious discriminatory purpose, according to Washington, "may often be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts." 93 Moreover, the historical
background of, and the specific events leading to, the law or official
90. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
91. 571 F.2d 209, 221-25 (5th Cir. 1978). Accord, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra
note 31, at 289 n.32.
92. 426 U.S. at 241.
93. 426 U.S. at 242.
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act are two of the relevant indicators of intent listed by the Supreme
Court in Arlington Heights. 94 The actual impact of the law is, of
course, a third indicator.95 All these kinds of evidence are considered under the tests announced in White 96 and Zimmer, 91 along
with other facts, to determine whether, in light of "the totality of the
circumstances,"98 a multimember district dilutes minority voting
strength.
Paige v. Gray99 illustrates how circumstantial evidence can show
that an electoral scheme was adopted with a discriminatory intent.
In that case, the historical background of the adoption of an at-large
election scheme included the facts that Georgia's all-white primaries
had recently been struck down and that a black-favored candidate
had been elected shortly thereafter. 100 The impact of the at-large
scheme was readily apparent: no black had ever been elected under
it. 101 On those facts, the court could have reasonably held that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to show that the at-large system
was adopted in order to impair black voting stength. 102 The plain94. 429 U.S. at 267-68.
95. 429 U.S. at 266.
96. 412 U.S. at 766-69.
97. 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), qffd. per curiam on other grounds sub
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
98. 412 U.S. at 769.
99. 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976).
100. 538 F.2d at 1109.
101. 538 F.2d at 1109.
102. Because the Fifth Circuit remanded Paige to the district court for evaluation under
While and Zimmer rather than und~r Gomillion, see text at notes 59-61 supra, it did not
"reach the question of whether the sequence of events leading to the passage of the [at-large
system) was sufficiently suspect to compel a finding of racial motivation." 538 F.2d at 1110.
The substantiality of the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove purposeful discrimination may vary slightly in different contexts. For example, the Supreme Court noted in Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), that
"[b]ecause of the nature of the jury-selection task . . . we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach the extremes of Yick Wo
or Gomillion." 429 U.S. at 266 n.13. See text at note 119 infra. In a case decided only
shortly thereafter, the Court inferred purposeful discrimination from a bare statistical disparity
between the number of Mexican-Americans called to serve as grand jurors and the proportion
of Mexican-Americans in the local population. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 & n.13
(1977). It may well be that the claim of racial vote dilution in a multimember district is
another context in which an acceptance of somewhat less substantial evidence may be appropriate. As explained in Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword.· In .Defense of the
Antidiscriminalion Principle, 90 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 1, 28-29 (1976):
[l]t often is difficult to determine whether a decision was discriminatorily motivated. If
courts may grant relief only when plaintiffs have made a clear case on the record, many
instances will remain where race-dependent decisions are strongly suspected but cannot
be proved. Although this is not essentially different from the difficulty facing the proponents in most litigation seeking to overturn government policies, it is especially troubling
in the race area. The accumulation of suspected but unproved race-dependent conduct
• • . may systematically deprive minorities of important benefits. And the very existence
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tiffs would, of course, then have to bring forth evidence of other factors listed in White to show that the system had diluted minority
voting strength.
In most multimember district challenges, minority voters could
produce circumstantial evidence that the district was adopted for the
purpose of diluting the minority vote. 103 Such a motive could not,
however, be proved in all such cases, for many currently dilutive
districting plans were initially adopted under "race-proof' circumstances when blacks were effectively disenfranchised. 104 Thus, the
argument runs, the plan could not have been adopted with a discriminatory intent.
Bolden v. City of Mobile 105 illustrates that circumstantial evidence can show that an electoral scheme, although adopted for neutral reasons, is maintained with the discriminatory intent of
impairing minority voting strength. The at-large plan in Bolden
had been enacted in 1911, when blacks were disenfranchised by the
Alabama constitution. 106 The evidence revealed, however, that no
black candidate had ever been elected, that voting was racially polarized, that the legislature was unresponsive to black needs, and that
election rules further impaired black voting strength. 107 From that
alone a court might infer that the plan was maintained for a discriminatory purpose. Moreover, and equally important, recent legislative attempts to perpetuate the at-large system, and the district
court's finding that the legislature was "acutely conscious of the racial consequences of its districting policies," 108 strongly suggest that
the election plan, although passed in "race-proof' circumstances,
was intentionally maintained to dilute minority voting strength once
the plan began to have that effect.
The Nevett court did not make clear, however, the scope of its
holding that circumstantial evidence of an intentional adoption or
of a state of affairs which "everyone knows" is based on racial discrimination but no one
will remedy is demoralizing and stigmatic.
(Footnote omitted.)
103. Many of the multimember districts in the South were adopted soon after black voter
registration was greatly increased by the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, 79 Stat 437 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1970)). See U.S. CoMMN.
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 21-24. That alone should raise suspicions about the purpose
of these enactments.
104. E.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978) (at-large system established in 1911); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (at-large system established in 1898).
105. 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
106. 571 F.2d at 245.
107. 571 F.2d at 243-44.
108. 571 F.2d at 246.
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maintenance of a dilutive districting satisfies Washington. Specifically, though it reads Kirksey as meaning that "an innocently formulated plan that perpetuates past intentional discrimination is
unconstitutional," 109 it does not resolve the ambiguity of Kirksey's
holding: Must the legislature adopting or maintaining a plan be
aware of the dilutive effect and consciously intend to perpetuate that
effect? Or does it suffice that the legislature, without a conscious discriminatory intent of its own, perpetuates the discriminatory intent
of past legislatures and of others? The language of Nevett suggests
that the court meant to require a conscious intent to impair minority
votes. 110 This Note argues, however, that the concept of intent
should be broader and that a racially selective indifference should
satisfy the requirement of purposeful discrimination.
2.

The White Test as an Indicator of Selective Racial Ind!lference

The Supreme Court did not define "purposeful discrimination"
in Washington or Arlington Heights.m The Nevett approach to reconciling the "White and Zimmer test with Washington apparently assumes that only a conscious purpose to impair minority voting
strength is sufficiently invidious to satisfy the purposeful discrimination requirement. That approach then suggests that at least some of
the factors listed in "White will reveal such a purpose. The initial
assumption of that approach, however, may not be fully justified.
Nothing in those cases indicates that the term is limited to racial
animus, 112 and it is certainly arguable that purposeful racial discrimination may appear in forms other than racial antagonism. 113 Decisions based on "racially selective sympathy and indifference," 114 like
decisions based on racial hostility, assume a differential worth of ra109. The quotation is from Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1978).
The panel that decided Bolden, Nevel/ and two other consolidated cases, is referred to by the
name of the most important case for convenience only.
110. See note 89 supra.
111. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 174 n.70.
112. It is argued in The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 174 n.170, that purposeful discrimination cannot "simply be racial animus; even clearly unconstitutional laws
may have been prompted not by a desire to harm blacks but by the belief that the good of both
races requires segregation."
113. Brest, supra note 102, at 7.
114. Id. Professor Brest defines "racially selective sympathy and indifference" as "the
unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition of humanity, and hence the
same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one's own group." Id. at 7-8. See
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 174: ''The use of racial stereotypes may be
unconscious, and legislators may discount the burdens a measure imposes on a minority group
without being aware that they are doing so." (Footnote omitted).
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cial groups. 115 Both decisions are unfair, "for by hypothesis, they
are decisions disadvantaging minority persons that would not be
made under the identical circumstances if they disadvantaged members of the dominant group." 116 Thus, "purposeful discrimination"
may be defined to include decisions that reflect a selective racial indifference as well as those that reflect racial hostility. 117
Rather than explore the meaning of "purpose" when faced with
election districting cases, lower federal courts 118 have been fond of
quoting Justice Stevens' remark in his concurring opinion in
Washington that "when the [disproportionate impact] is as dramatic
as in Gomillion v. Lighifoot . .. or Yick Wt:! v. Hopkins, . .. it really
does not matter whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose
or effect." 119 However, the disproportionate impact of a redrawn
boundary that excludes from the city all the blacks but none of the
whites, as in Gomillion, or of the enforcement of an ordinance
against 150 Chinese but against no whites, as in Yick Wo, can be
quantified in a manner that the impact of multimember districts cannot. Thus, the invidious impact of a multimember district is never
as immediately obvious as the invidious discrimination in Gomillion
and Yick Wo.
More helpful may be Justice Stevens' recognition of the problem
of defining "purposeful discrimination": even though the requirement of purposeful discrimination "is a common thread" running
through racial discrimination cases, 120 the Court has never defined
the term. Indeed, what constitutes "purposeful discrimination" may ,
be different in different cases. After summarizing the various cases
discussed in the majority opinion in Washington, Justice Stevens
suggested that:
[a]lthough it may be proper to use the same language to describe the
constitutional claim in each of these contexts, the burden of proving a
prima facie case may well involve differing evidentiary considerations.
The extent of deference that one pays to the trial court's determination
of the factual issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes
the intent issue as a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in
different contexts. 121
115. Brest, supra note 102, at 8.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 7.
118. See Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1110 n.3 (5th.Cir. 1976); Paige v. Gray, 437 F.
Supp. 137, 160 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
119. 426 U.S. at 254 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
120. 426 U.S. at 253 (concurring opinion).
121. 426 U.S. at 253 (concurring opinion).
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Thus, a prima facie showing of a purposeful discrimination in an
election districting claim need not require proof of a conscious intent
to dilute minority voting strength. If a legislature regards the impact of a districting scheme with an insensitivity that would not be
present if the scheme were disadvantageous to white rather than
black voters, then the adoption or retention of that scheme should
constitute purposeful discrimination. So defined, purposeful discrimination can be proved with circumstantial evidence like that in
White: a history of official discrimination-political and otherwise-and a lack of good-faith concern by the legislature for minority interests. 122 Both factors suggest racially selective indifference, if
not racial antagonism, on the part of the legislature. Where these
factors in combination with other factors listed in White 123 demonstrate that the districting scheme in question dilutes minority voting
strength, an equal protection claim, complete with purposeful discrimination, has been established.
This interpretation of Washington's intent requirement resolves
122. 412 U.S. at 766-69. One commentator has suggested that the relevance of historical
discrimination or of discrimination in social contexts not directly related to voting "can be
explained only insofar as these elements support a fmding of purposeful discrimination" underlying the adoption of the election scheme. Note, supra note 50, at 380 n.137. On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit has held that no causal relationship need exist between past social and
political discrimination and a denial of access to the political process since "[i]nequality of
access is an inference which flows from the existence of economic and educational inequalities." Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 968 (1977).
The commentator's statement is too narrow. Past discrimination can hinder minority political participation in a variety of ways. The inferior education almost inevitable in a de jure
dual school system can reduce the number of minority citizens educationally prepared to participate in politics effectively. Moreover, in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri- .
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), the Supreme Court did not dispute the assertion that inferior
education hinders the "intelligent utilization of the right to vote." Discrimination in employment may limit the number of minorities fmancially able to seek office or to support a candidate. Stringent or unfairly administered voter registration laws may leave many potential
minority voters with no vote at all. More generally, pervasive discrimination may imbue
many minority voters with a sense that voting is futile. Cf. Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 145 (white
bloc voting may lead blacks to consider registration futile). Thus, evidence of past discrimination is probative of more than simply the likelihood that the enactment of a particular election
scheme was discriminatorily motivated.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit's statement in Kirksey is too broad: a denial of access
to the political process should not be inferred from every instance of racial discrimination.
Bui see Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1974), where the fact that city
recreational centers and the Boy's Club were racially segregated was deemed relevant to the
black voters' challenge to a multimember district. The issue is noted in Brest, supra note 102,
at 35: "When an act of discrimination denies its victims a benefit (e.g., the right to vote), a
fmding that the present state of affairs (the disproportionately small number of blacks registered to vote) was caused by past discrimjnation is tantamount to a determination that past
discrimination inflicts present injuries."
123. E.g., a small number of successful minority-preferred candidates; racial bloc voting;
racial campaign tactics; a large multimember district; majority, place, or anti-single shot rules;
restrictive voter registration requirements; and cultural or language barriers that make community participation difficult. See 412 U.S. at 766-69.
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the ambiguity of Kirksey's, holcling.124 It is unclear whether the
Kirksey court held that the defendant board of supervisors had consciously perpetuated past intentional discrimination when it adopted
the districting plan. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs "presented substantial unrefuted evidence showing a past record of racial discrimination engaged in by the county and of official unresponsiveness to the
needs of the countis black citizens." 125 In light of these facts, the
court could reasonably infer that the challenged districting scheme,
which perpetuated a denial of political participation even though
drawn and adopted without a conscious discriminatory intent, was
enacted with a selective racial indifference and would not have been
enacted had it disadvantaged white rather than black voters. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Bolden presented evidence of past discrimination126 and official unresponsiveness. 127 Although the vote-dilutive,
at-large system in that case had been adopted when blacks had no
vote, the court could infer from the totality of the relevant facts that
the retention of the at-large system evidenced a racial insensitivity
sufficient to satisfy the purposeful discrimination requirement. 128
This is not to say that all legislative acts may be condemned because of past injustice. A mere history of discrimination and unresponsiveness to minority interests should not bar the legislature from
adopting a districting scheme based upon valid motives. But where
plaintiffs can show that the debilitating effects of past discrimination
continue to inhibit minority political participation and that the legislature has been unresponsive to minority interests in the relatively
recent past, it is logical to conclude that the adoption or retention of
a district plan that perpetuates a denial of minority access to the political process reflects a selective racial indifference and should be
invalidated as purposeful racial discrimination.
124. See text at notes 88-89 supra.
125. 554 F.2d at 143-44.
126. 571 F.2d at 243.
127. 571 F.2d at 243.
128. Surely racial insensitivity constituting purposeful discrimination can be manifested
through inaction as well as action. It is naive to suppose that legislators are unaware of the
impact that the districting scheme under which they were elected has upon voting strength.
Where a districting scheme minimizes the voting strength of an element of the electorate, it can
be inferred that the legislators are indifferent toward that element. They would obviously not
be indifferent if the district had the same impact upon voters of the dominant group. Thus, a
finding of purposeful discrimination would not be incongruous with the fact that the districting scheme in question was adopted at a time when blacks were disenfranchised, and has been
unchanged since.
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Immunizing White from Washington: Vote .Dilution as
Infringement of a Fundamental Interest

The Supreme Court may eventually clarify its notion of "purposeful discrimination." If the Court decides that selective racial
indifference does not constitute purposeful discrimination, the
problems raised by Kirksey will remain unresolved so long as White
must be reconciled with Washington. The multimember district
cases can be seen as unaffected by Washington, however, if they are
viewed as relying upon fundamental interest analysis, a branch of
the law of equal protection unchanged by that case.
1.

Suspect Classifications and Fundamental Interests

Absent compelling justification, the equal protection clause prohibits state action that discriminates against "suspect classifications,"
such as racial or ethnic groups, or that significantly infringes upon a
fundamental interest. 129 White, as yet the only Supreme Court decision declaring a multimember district unconstitutional, appeared
to involve both racial discrimination and a fundamental interest. 130
The Court in White did not say, however, whether it conceptualized
the issue as involving racial discrimination, the fundamental interest
of voting, or both; 131 the Court's language is ambiguous. The Court
focused on the racial minority plaintiffs in noting that in prior cases
it had "entertained claims that multimember districts are being used
invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial
groups." 132 More broadly, however, it required challengers of multimember districts to show that "the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by
the group in question." 133
· 129. J>evelopments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1088, 1120
(1969).
130. Voting is clearly a fundamental interest. According to the Supreme Court in San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973), only those rights
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" are deemed fundamental. In Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), the Court stated that it "has made clear that a citizen
has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other
citizens in the jurisdiction." See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
131. The multimember district cases have not expressly invoked the standard equal protection analysis of restrained or active review, suspect classification or fundamental interest. One
commentator has suggested that the Court in White implicitly treated the multimember district as both a burden upon a suspect class and an infringement upon a fundamental interest.
The commentator then inferred that the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard and failed to
find a compellillg state interest. See Note, supra note 50, at 372-73.
132. 412 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added).
133. 412 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added).
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It is not clear from White alone, therefore, whether the Court
conceptualized a multimember district that dilutes racial voting
strength as a type of racial discrimination or as a type of infringement upon the fundamental right to vote. 134 The distinction is significant because it may help resolve the uncertainty about the
relevance of intent and effect in multimember district challenges.
The Supreme Court has generally insisted upon proof of discriminatory intent in racial discrimination cases, but it has been satisfied
with proof of a significant infringement in fundamental interest
cases. 135 It is necessary, then, to determine which approach to equal
protection analysis the Court has used in multimember district decisions.
Briefly stated, racially motivated laws or official acts are presumed to be invidious because they commonly rest upon generalized, irrational assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups
and often impose upon the minority a stigma of inferiority or the
frustration of an injury inflicted because of an immutable, inherited personal trait. 136 . Of course, stigma and frustration may result
as well from disadvantaging decisions that were not racially motivated. Differentiation between individuals is necessary, however,
and a presumption against all differentiations that stigmatize or frustrate regardless of intent or rationality would affect "an enormously
wide range of practices important to the efficient operation of a complex industrial society." 137 The presumption of invalidity is limited,
therefore, to decisions based upon race, since they are both harmful
because they stigmatize and of little social value because they are too
often irrational. 138
In fundamental interest cases, the Court is concerned with the
interference with a right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. 139 Whether a challenged law or act is invidious depends upon the significance of the interference. 140 Intent is less im134. But see Justice Brennan's chara<;terization in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 170 (1977) (concurring opinion), of Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), as
involving a suspect classification. Neither Whitcomb nor any of the Supreme Court multimember decisions have ever invoked the suspect classification analysis, however.
13S. Compare, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), with Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
136. Brest, supra note 102, at 6-12.
137. Id. at I I.
138. Id.
139. See San Antonio Independent School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973).
140. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
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portant in fundamental interest cases because, unlike racially
motivated laws, the statutes or acts in question are not suspected
either of resting on irrational assumptions about the differential
worth of racial groups or of imposing any stigma or frustration upon
a minority group. The concern in these cases is that the statute or
act may unjustifiably interfere with a fundamental interest possessed
by most citizens. Therefore, rather than examining the law's underlying intent, the Court evaluates the potential state interests supporting the law. Where the interference is substantial, the statute will be
upheld only if it is supported by "sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." 141
2.

Multimember JJistricting as an Infringement of a Fundamental
Interest

The origin and development of the multimember district problem suggest that, although thus far only racial or ethnic minorities
have successfully challenged multimember districts, the Supreme
Court views the problem as an infringement on the· fundamental
right to vote and is willing to hear challenges by members of political
as well as racial groups. So viewed, the Court's emphasis in White
on effect is understandable. Moreover, if White is seen as a fundamental interest case, it is unaltered by Washington, which, of course,
dealt with a suspect classification.
The landmark case in apportionment and districting is Reynolds
v. Sims, 142 which stated that "the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society." 143 The right to vote is fundamental because "representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives."1 44 Thus,

'
each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective
participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies.
Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters
through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore,
that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of
members of his state legislature. 145

141. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
142. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
143. 377 U.S. at 561-62.
144. 377 U.S. at 565.
145. 377 U.S. at 565. The rule of Reynolds was applied to local governmental units in
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968): "Similarly, when the State delegates lawmaking power to local government and provides for the election of local officials from districts
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The right to vote, then, is the right to full and effective participation
in the political process. To assure each citizen an equally effective
voice, the Court in Reynolds held that; in apportionment plans, "the
overriding objective must be substantial equality of population
among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen." 146
Less than one year later, in Fortson v. .Dorsey, 147 the Supreme
Court faced the allegation that citizens who lived in districts substantially equal in population to all other districts in the state, but who
joined with citizens from other districts in their county to elect several representatives at large, were denied a vote "approximately
equal in weight" to the vote of those citizens who simply elected one
representative from their district. 148 The plaintiffs claimed that the
multimember districts violated the rule in Reynolds "because
county-wide voting in multi-district counties could, as a matter of
mathematics, result in the nullification of the unanimous choice of
the voters of a district, thereby thrusting upon them a senator for
whom no one in the district had voted." 149 The Court was unpersuaded: ''It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district
county as the representative of only that district within the county
wherein he resides. . . . [S]ince his tenure depends upon the countywide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the
people in the county . . . ." 150 The Court added in dicta, however,
that its opinion
is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all circumstances such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates of
the Equal Protection Clause. It might well be that, designedly or
otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under
the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. 151
specified by statute, ordinance, or local charter, it must insure that those qualified to vote have
the right to an equally effective voice in the election process."
146. 377 U.S. at 579.
147. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
148. 379 U.S. at 436-37. The Georgia senatorial apportionment plan attacked in Fortson
created 54 districts. Thirty-one districts each contained from one to eight counties. The remaining 21 districts were located in the seven most populous counties; with each of these
counties containing from two to seven districts. The 21 districts were created for the purpose
of a representative residence requirement only: the voters in these districts joined with the
voters of the other .districts in the county to elect all the county's senators at large. ,379 U.S. at
435.
149. 379 U.S. at 437.
150. 379 U.S. at 438.
151. 379 U.S. at 439.
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The implication seems clear. In some multimember districts, unlike the district in Fortson, the representatives' success will not depend upon the district-wide electorate. Where multimember
districting allows representatives to ignore the interests of a particular element of the voting population, then the voting strength of that
element has been cancelled out. Perhaps at the time of Fortson the
Court only vaguely sensed those circumstances in which a multimember district would render the support of particular groups unimportant in this manner. The subsequent cases have shown that the
minimi2.ation of voting strength may occur where the district-wide
population is large in comparison to the size of the group in question, where past or present discrimination inhibits that group's general political participation, or where electoral rules increase the
difficulty of electing a minority-supported candidate.
Fortson suggested that the right to full and effective participation
in the political process-the fundamental right established in
Reynolds-may be violated by a cancelling out of voting strength in
a multimember district as well as by an inequality of population
among single-member districts. Inquiry into the multimember district problem necessarily involved "the practical realities of representation,"152 rather than the simple mathematical comparison of
populations among single-member districts. But the goal of the inquiry was the same in both cases: to ensure an equally effective voice
in the political process. It appears, therefore, that the Supreme
Court conceptualized the multimember district problem as a threat
to the fundamental right to vote, not strictly as a potential form of
racial discrimination.
The Court in Fortson correctly noted that racial minorities are
the most likely victims of a minimization of voting strength. Its reference to "racial or political elements" 153 should not be read, however, as limiting the vote dilution claim to those groups. Because
those are the groups whose members are most likely to vote only for
members of the same group, they are the groups in greatest danger of
vote dilution. Nonetheless, the voting strength of other types of
groups could be minimized in a multimember district. If so, the
fundamental right of those voters would be violated as well.
The Court's approach to multimember district challenges has not
changed since Fortson. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 154 the Court quoted
152. 379 U.S. at 437-38.
153. 379 U.S. at 439.
154. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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the Reynolds principle that " '[f]ull and effective participation by all
citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen have an
equally effective voice' " in the political process. 155 The Court also
repeated the "racial or political elements" statement of Fortson. 156
The language in White is ambiguous, 157 but in Gqffney v. Cummings, 158 argued and decided on the same days as White, the Court
again quoted the Fortson reference to "racial or political elements."
Later cases further reveal that the Supreme Court still views vote
dilution in multimember districts broadly as an infringement upon
the fundamental right to vote, not narrowly as a form only of racial
discrimination. In Dallas County v. Reese, 159 decided two years after White, the Court reiterated that a multimember district will be
vulnerable if it "in fact operates impermissibly to dilute tqe voting
strength of an ident!fiable element of the voting population." 160 And
most recently in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 161 the Court
again reaffirmed that districting plans will be subject to attack if they
minimize the voting strength of "racial or political groups. " 162
Although Washington sharpened the focus upon discriminatory
intent in racial discrimination claims, it did not shift the focus from
the significance of the infringement in fundamental interest
claims. 163 Indeed, the most recent fundamental interest case,
155. 403 U.S. at 141 (quoting 377 U.S. at 565).
156. 403 U.S. at 143.
157. See text at notes 130-33 supra.
158. 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439).
159. 421 U.S. 477 (1975) (per curiam).
160. 421 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in .Dallas County were urban voters
who alleged that their voting strength was minimized because, under the electoral statute, only
one representative could be elected from their district in a county-wide at-large election even
though that district comprised almost one half the four-district county population. The
Supreme Court's rejection of that claim rested upon Fortson: so long as the districts were a
basis for residence only, and not for representation, the elected representatives had to be vigilant to serve all the voters in the county. The Court made it clear, however, that urban voters
could successfully attack a multimember district if it in fact minimized their voting strength.
421 U.S. at 480.
161. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
162. 430 U.S. at 167 (emphasis original). As a practical matter, racial or ethnic groups are
more likely than political groups to challenge a multimember district successfully. Racial
discrimination, bloc voting, and large districts all increase the possibility that the interests of
racial or ethnic groups within the multimember district can be ignored. These are the types of
"practical realities of representation in a multi-member constituency," Fortson v. Dorsey, 379
U.S. 433, 437-38 (1965), that the Supreme Court demands as proof of vote dilution. That a
nonracial political group can marshal sufficient evidence to prove that a multimember district
submerges its voice is certainly not inconceivable, however.
163. The Supreme Court's statement in Washington of "the basic equal protection principle" is limited to racial discrimination claims: "[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 426
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Zablocki v. Redhail, 164 examined the alleged infringement at length
without mention of Washington. It is logical to suggest, therefore,
that the White test has not been altered by Washington and that the
Supreme Court will not require proof of purposeful discrimination

even when vote-dilution challenges to multimember districts are
brought by racial groups.
C.

JJistinguishing White and Washington: Vote JJi/ution as
JJiscrimination Affecting Only Minorities

Even if racial vote dilution in multimember districts is analyzed
as a form of racial discrimination rather than as an infringement
upon a fundamental interest, the White·test might still be unaffected
by Washington's intent requirement. The Supreme Court's insistence
upon purpose in racial discrimination claims derives in part from its
concern over the impracticality of disproportionate-impact analysis.
As the Court noted in Washington, if an otherwise neutral statute
were held invalid, absent compelling justification, solely because "in
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another," then a
whole range of governmental tests, qualifications, and fee schedules
could be called into question, however rational or neutrally motivated they may be. 16s
Moreover, the Court's rejection of disproportionate-impact analysis rests upon at least two principles. The first principle, a presumption of rationality, was stated clearly in Washington: the Court
will not review "the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and
executives" without some evidence that an impermissible consideration-such as racial discrimination-affected the decision challenged.166 The second principle was not expressed in either decision
but probably underlay both: the equal protection clause protects individuals, not groups, 167 and does not recognize a minority individual's sense of stigma or frustration as sufficiently harmful to.
invalidate a rational law applied neutrally to the majority of citizens
where that stigma arises from the mere fact that a disproportionate
number of those disadvantaged by the law happen to be of the same
U.S. at 240 (emphasis added). Surely it does not follow that the Court will focus as intently
upon purpose in fundamental interest cases.
164. 434 U:S. 374 (1978) (right to marry).
165. 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14.
166. 426 U.S. at 247. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev,
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
167. Goodman, lJe Facto Sc/tool Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 275, 300-01 (1972).
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minority. 168 The disproportionate impact may be great enough to
suggest a discriminatory purpose, 169 but the Court in Washington
rejected "the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact."110
At first glance, Washington's rejection of disproportionate-impact analysis might appear to conflict with the test developed in
White for determining vote dilution in multi.member districts. 171
The White standard-which requires inquiry into the local history
of racial discrimination, the responsiveness of the elected white officials, the success or failure of minority-supported candidates, the size
of the district, and the presence or absence of majority, place, and
anti-single shot rules 172--clearly focuses on the impact of the multimember district on minority voting. Nonetheless, an examination
of the Court's understanding of "disproportionate impact" suggests
that the effect-oriented test of White is still sound. The language of
Washington and the prior disproportionate-impact cases cited in that
decision 173 reveal that the Court will not invalidate a prima facie
neutral law where the law burdens more blacks than whites but does
not burden an individual black more than a similarly situated
white. 174 Where the law burdens only blacks, however, the Court
will declare- it unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court said in Washington that it had "recently rejected allegations of racial discrimination based solely on the statistically disproportionate racial impact of various provisions of the
Social Security Act," 175 citing Jefferson v. Hackney. 116 In Jefferson,
168. But see Perry, Tire .Disproportionate Impact Tlteory ofRacial .Discrimination, 125 U.
PJ\. L. REv. 540, 558 n.99 (1977):
The relevant perspective is less that of the disadvantaged individual than the perspective
of the entire racial minority. The disproportionate character of the disadvantage, because
it constitutes a severe impediment to the racial minority in its difficult struggle to escape
the legacy of slavery and oppression and to achieve real social equality, is especially burdensome.
(Emphasis original).
169. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266
(1977); Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
170. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis original). This rejection of disproportionate-impact analysis applies only to equal protection claims. Title VII, and perhaps other statutory claims, may
still focus on impact alone. 426 U.S. at 239, 247-48.
171. See Tire Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 289 n.32.
172. See 412 U.S. at 765-69.
173. See 426 U.S. at 241 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)).
174. See also Goodman, supra note 167, at 306.
175. 426 U.S. at 240.
176. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).

728

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:694

the plaintiffs alleged that they were denied equal protection when
the state, after establishing a pecuniary standard of need for all Social Security recipients, paid a different percentage of that standard
to recipients of different grant programs. 177 The plaintiffs made no
attempt to prove purposeful discrimination; 178 rather, they claimed
that the payment scheme disproportionately affected blacks and
Mexican-Americans because those minorities comprised a substantial majority of the grant class receiving the lowest percentage of the
pecuniary standard. 179 The Supreme Court rejected this "naked statistical argument" since the "acceptance of appellants' constitutional
theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among
grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however
otherwise rational the treatment might be." 18 Clearly, the payment
scheme disadvantaged more blacks and Mexican-Americans than
whites. Those minorities were not the only persons disadvantaged,
however; since the scheme's impact fell just as heavily on white recipients in the same grant class, no equal protection violation had
occurred.
The Supreme Court in Washington 181 also suggested that James
v. Valtierra 182 could be compared with Hunter v. Erickson. 183 These
two cases reveal the distinction between impacts that offend the
equal protection clause and those that do not. The complaint in
James resembled that in Jefferson. The California Constitution provided that no low-income housing project could be developed by a
state body until the project was approved by a majority of those voting in a community referendum. 184 Claiming that the impact of the
law fell most heavily upon the urban poor and that a "disproportionally high percentage of racial minorities" comprised that group, 185
the plaintiffs alleged a denial of equal protection. By contrast, the

°

177. Recipients in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program received 75% of
the established standard. Those in the Aid to the Blind and the Aid for the Permanently and
Totally Disabled programs received 95%. Recipients in the Old Age Assistance program received 100% of the standard. 406 U.S. at 545.
178. 406 U.S. at 547-48.
179. 406 U.S. at 548. The plaintiffs did not claim that the disproportionate impact was so
dramatic that it implied purposeful discrimination.
180. 406 U.S. at 548.
181. 426 U.S. at 241.
182. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
183. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
184. 402 U.S. at 139.
185. Brief for Appellee Housing Authority of the City of San Jose at 7, James v, Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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plaintiffs in Hunter challenged the constitutionality of a city charter
amendment, passed by the electorate, that required that any ordinance regulating property transactions "on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors." 186 In neither case did the plaintiffs attempt to
prove racially discriminatory intent. 1s7
The Court struck down the law challenged in Hunter and upheld
the law contested in James. In James, the burden of the law fell on
more minorities than whites, but it did not fall exclusively on minorities since the provision required "referendum approval for any lowrent public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority." 188 In Hunter, the Supreme Court held
that the challenged law "disadvantages those who would benefit
from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations" and
that, "although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and
gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact
falls on the minority." 189 Thus, Hunter was not a case of disproportionate impact as that term is understood in Jefferson and James,
where the impact burdened individuals of various group identities
but burdened proportionately more individuals of one group than
any other. The burdening impact of the provision in Hunter fell
solely on the minority since, as the Court realized, "[t]he majority
needs no protection against discrimination." 190 And the Court declared that this type of burdening impact, as opposed to merely statistically disproportionate impact, violated the equal protection
clause.
The Court's reliance on the burdening impact in Hunter as a basis for invalidating the law at issue in that case does not violate either
of the principles underlying the rejection of disproportionate-impact
analysis. Judicial deference to legislative acts is appropriate when
those acts are rational and not arbitrary. On the other hand, bur186. 393 U.S. at 387.
187. But cf. 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting that the provision at issue
had "the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to
achieve legislation that is in their interest'').
188. 402 U.S. at 141. Three of the dissenting Justices would have held the provision unconstitutional as an express discrimination against the poor. 402 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
189. 393 U.S. at 391.
190. 393 U.S. at 391. The idea that the majority needs no protection against discrimination may not be as self-evident today as it was several years ago. See Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning in Hunter was sound.
Though the challenged provision applied to whites as well as blacks, in reality it would have
disadvantaged only blacks.
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dens that fall solely on a minority are presumptively irrational and
warrant a more probing judicial review. Moreover, the equal protection clause protects the individual, not the group, when invoked
in the face of a law burdening only the minority. The individual's
injury-that he is disadvantaged solely because of his minority status-is, of course, felt by others of the minority group as well. Unlike the plaintiff challenging a merely statistically disproportionate
impact, however, the plaintiff challenging an impact that falls solely
upon his group need not rely on the injury to others to state his
claim. His individual injury offends the equal protection clause.
With these precedents in mind, the reason why the plaintiffs did
not prevail in Washington becomes clear. Their allegation that the
screening test was unconstitutional because it "excluded a disproportionately high number of Negro applicants" 191 presented no more
than a statistically disproportionate-impact analysis. 192 As in
Je.fferson and James, that approach was unsuccessful. 193 According
to Washington, then, the equal protection clause is not violated simply because "a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than
members of other racial or ethnic groups." 194
It is important to note that the disproportionate-impact approach
had earlier proved equally unsuccessful in the multimember district
cases. The Supreme Court stated in 'White that, for plaintiffs to sustain a vote dilution claim, "it is not enough that the racial group
allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential." 195 Thus, something more than the
191. 426 U.S. at 233.
192. The Court has not completely rejected the use of statistics in proving a denial of equal
protection. Indeed, since Washington the Court has given great weight to statistical evidence
of a disproportion between minority population and minority jury participation. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Nonetheless, the Court in Castaneda was merely
following the rule it established in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 & n.13 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976),
that a sufficiently dramatic disproportionate impact may evidence purposeful discrimination.
193. That approach was, however, understandable. Prior to Washington, the Supreme
Court's decisions left the role of purpose and effect unclear, and many lower courts had
adopted a disproportionate-impact analysis as the standard by which to assess claims of racial
discrimination allegedly violating the equal protection clause. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242-45 & n.12 (1976).
194. 426 U.S. at 245.
195. 412 U.S. at 765-66. In fact, the Supreme Court's reversal in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971), revg. 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), was no more than a rejection of
disproportionate-impact analysis. The trial court had "identified an area of the city as a ghet•
to, found it predominantly inhabited by poor Negroes with distinctive substantive-law interests
and thought this group unconstitutionally underrepresented because the proportion oflegisla•
tors with residences in the ghetto . . . was less than the ghetto's proportion of the population."
403 U.S. at 148. Absent evidence that the ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other
residents of the district to participate in the political process, the Supreme Court held that the
bare disproportion was insufficient to prove an invidious discrimination. 403 U.S. at 149.
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naked statistical argument rejected in Jefferson all.d James is required to invalidate a multimember district. According to White,
the plaintiffs must show that "the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the
group in question." 196
Thus, it is clear that the White test, though characterized as effect- or impact-oriented, involves more than simply disproportionate-impact analysis. Many interest groups, racial and nonracial,
may be disadvantaged by the multimember district, for they might
well be less likely to elect one of their own number in a multimember than in a single-member district. The mere failure to elect a
favored candidate does not, however, violate the Constitution; 197 all
that is required is that each group have a voice in the political process. Yet, where a racial group has had its political participation inhibited by official and private discrimination, has been the target of
bloc voting, and has been denied the legislature's responsiveness in
the past and may be similarly denied in the future, that group has
been denied access to the political process in violation of the White
test. In this context, the multimember district more than decreases
the likelihood that a minority-favore~ candidate will be elected; indeed, it guarantees that neither candidates nor legislators need listen
to that group's voice. Thus, although many groups may be disadvantaged by a multimember district, only such a racial group's voting strength is minimized or cancelled out by that electoral scheme.
In the final analysis, the impact revealed through proof of the White
test for multimember districts more closely resembles that in Hunter
than in Jefferson or James: it "places special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process." 198
Preservation of White's effect-oriented test, therefore, would not
be inconsistent with the concerns the Supreme Court articulated in
Washington. The White test does not open the floodgates to a tide
of disproportionate-impact claims. Nor does it violate the principles
on which Washington rejected disproportionate-impact analysis.
Similarly, in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), a.ffd. per curiam
on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976), the
Fifth Circuit recognized that the evaluation of multimember districts involves more than a
numerical inquiry: "[A]ccess to the political process and not population [is] the barometer of
dilution of minority voting strength." 485 F.2d at 1303. In addition, see Beer v. United
States, 425, U.S. 130, 157 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196. 412 U.S. at 766.
191. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971): "As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others lose. . . . But we have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection to
deny legislative seats to losing candidates. . . ."
198. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
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Surely even under Washington the court may justly withhold its judicial deference to legislative acts where their vote-dilutive impact
falls, as it can in multimember districts, solely on the minority. Finally, under White the right to vote remains an individual right, 199
and the plaintiff claiming vote dilution clearly asserts such a right.

N.

CONCLUSION

White's effect-oriented test for multimember districts is unaffected by Washington's insistence upon discriminatory intent in racial discrimination claims. Whether viewed as a measure of a
fundamental interest or of racial discrimination, the White test falls
outside the scope of Washington's intent requirement. Thus, in vote
dilution cases the inquiry remains whether the multimember district
minimizes or cancels out minority voting strength. That inquiry is
simply a part of the constitutionally mandated goal of all election
districting: to ensure each voter "an equally effective voice" in the
political process.200
199. See 412 U.S. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. S33, S61 &
n.39 (1964).
200. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at S6S.

